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RECENT DECISIONS
state could protect his good will, usually built up at great expense, by enforcement
of his prices against all retailers selling his products, whether or not they had
so contracted, he can now only enforce such contracts against the signatories. Con-
tracting with every outlet is obviously impossible in most cases, and to require
such a contract as a basis for enjoining price cutters, cripples the whole resale
price maintenance program. It is for this very reason that all of the State Fair
Trade Acts include non-signer provisions. See 24 Calif. L Rev. 640 (1949).
It is believed that the present interpretation of the Miller-Tydings Act which dis-
rupts long established business practices and reduces the intent of Congress to
a legislative anachronism will soon be met by remedial legislation.
John A. Krull
NEGLIGENCE-MacPHERSON v. BUICK HELD INAPPLICABLE WHERE
ALLEGED DEFECT IS OBVIOUS TO USER
Plaintiff was injured when he caught his fingers in an onion topping machine
manufactured by defendant. Plaintiff, a remote user, (not in privity of contract
with defendant), claimed that the defendant was negligent in manufacturing a
dangerous machine in that: (1) the cutters were not guarded and (2) the
operator had no means of stopping the machine from where he stood. The trial
court denied a motion by defendant to dismiss the complaint and the Appellate
Division reversed. The Court of Appeals in affirming the Appellate Division
held: the complaint does not state a cause of action in negligence; there is no duty
owed by a manufacturer to a remote user when the alleged defects are obvious.
Campo v. Scofield, 301 N. Y. 468, 95 N. E. 2d 802 (1950).
It was the "general rule" at-common law that manufacturers and suppliers
were not liable for injuries caused by their negligence to anyone except those with
whom they had privity of contract. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109,
152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). Reasons advanced in support of this rule were that
the manufacturer could not foresee injury to persons other than the purchaser,
Huset v. J. L Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903), and that
industry could not bear the onus of responsibilty .to so large a class of people.
Longmeid v. Holliday, 6 Ex. 761, 155 Eng. Rep. 752 (1851). See 164 A.LR.
569, Manufacturers Liability For Negligence ... There were several exceptions
to this general rle. A duty was owed to the one injured: (1) where the article
was imminently dangerous to life or health, (2) where there was an invitation
to use a defective product on the owner's premises, and (3) where the defend-
ant knew the article to be dangerous and failed to give notice. Huset v. J. L Case
Threshing Machine Co., supra at 870.
Early New York cases recognized similar exceptions and a duty was held
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owing to third persons by the manufacturer where poison was falsely labeled,
Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852); a scaffold was
defective, Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 470, 42 Am. Rep. 311 (1882); a bottle of
aerated water exploded, Torgesen v. Schultz, 192 N. Y. 470, 84 N. E. 956 (1908);
a coffee urn exploded, Statler v. Ray Manufacturing Co., 195 N. Y. 478, 88 N. E.
1063 (1909). Finally in Mac Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111
N. E. 1050 (1916), an ultimate purchaser was allowed recovery when injured by
the collapse of a defective automobile wheel Ostensibly the decision extended
the class of inherently dangerous articles to include anything which foreseeably
would be dangerous if negligently made. Subsequent New York cases have
held manufacturers liable for personal injuries to those who'were not purchasers
but weremerely users of the chattel. Rosebrock v. General Electric Co., 236 N.
Y. 227, 140 N. E. 571 (1923); Hoenig v. Central Stamping Co, 273 N. Y.
485, 6 N. E. 2d 415 (1936). As to liability for property damage, see Genesee
County Patrons Fire Relief Assn. v. Sonneborn, 263 N. Y. 463, 189 N. E. 551
(1934).
Campo v. Scofield, the principal case, holds that "the duty owed by a manu-
facturer to remote users does not require him to guard against hazards' apparent."
Therefore, where a manufacturer would normally be liable (ollowing Mac Pherson
v. Buick, supra, he will be relieved of liability where the dangers from an unsafely
designed machine are obvious. Should the manufacturer's duty to the user be
precluded because of the patency of the danger in the machine which he con-
structed?
The court, without violating precedent, might have found that a duty existed
between the manufacturer and the remote user even though the alleged defect
was obvious. True there were cases that in dicta declared that a duty is owed only
if the defect or danger be not "known" or "patent" or discoverable "by reasonable
inspection." See Genesee Co. Patrons Fire Relief Ass'n. v. Sonneborn, supra at
468, 189 N. E. at 552; Noone v. Perlberg, Inc., 268 App. Div. 149, 152, 49
N. Y. S. 2d 460, 462, (1st Dept. 1944), aff'd, 294 N. Y. 680, 60 N. E. 2d 839(1945). But in these cases the defects were latent. The New York courts have
allowed children to recover against manufacturers of dangerous toys for not giving
adequate warning of the risk, although some danger was obvious. Henry v. Crook,
202 App. Div. 19, 195 N. Y. S. 624 (3rd Dept. 1922); Christ v. Art Metal Works,
230 App. Div. 114, 243 N. Y. S. 496 (1st Dept. 1930). A duty to a remote
user was recognized where a manufacturer failed to guard an X-Ray machine,
O'Connell v. Westinghouse X-Ray Co. 288 N. Y. 486, 41 N. E. 2d 177 (1942)
and also where there was a failure to place a safe-guard on a washing machine.
De War v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 49 N. Y. S. 2d 654 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
The court might have chosen in this case to apply the ordinary rules of neg-
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ligence: a duty arising not by any anachronistic relationship, but by defendant's
affirmative conduct likely to affect the interests of the plaintiff. From Cardozo's
opinion in the Mac Pherson case emerges the fundamental principle that the duty
to use care arises not by contract but when the manufacturer's conduct creates a
foreseeable danger to the plaintiff. In Massachusetts, where the court in David-
son v. Nichols, 11 Allen 514 (Mass. 1866) held a manufacturer owes no duty to
a remote vendee, the court now has declared the general rule to be abolished,
stating "the Mac Pherson case caused the exception to swallow the asserted gen-
eral rule of nonliability." Carter v. Yardley, 319 Mass. 92, 64 N. E. 2d 693,
700 (1946). See Peairs, The God in the Machine, 29 B. U. L. Rev. 37 (1949).
The Restatement, Torts Sec. 398 (1934) recognizes a duty to use care in
the adoption of a safe plan or design in the manufacture of a chattel. Cf. Davlin
v. Ford, Inc., 20 F. 2d 317, 319 (6th Cir. 1927); United States Radiator Corp. v.
Henderson, 68 F. 2d 87, 91 (10th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 292 U. S. 650 (1934);
Reusch v. Ford Motor Co., 196 Wis. 213, 82 P. 2nd 556, 559 (1938); Johnson
v. Murray Co., 90 S. W. 2d 920, 925 (Texas 1936). Recovery was denied
where the negligence alleged was the dangerous construction of an unguarded
hay baler. Yaun v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 253 Wis. 558, 34 N. W. 2d 853
(1948).
In Campo v. Scofield, supra, if a duty to the plaintiff can be found by ap-
proaching the facts with the basic principles of negligence, there will not necessarily
be liability. Liability will depend on a finding as to whether there was' failure
to use reasonable care under the circumstances, i. e. negligence, or whether there
was such contributory fault as to deny recovery. If reasonable men can differ,
these are questions of fact for the jury. O'Connell v. 11estinghouse X-Ray Co.,
supra at 487, 41 N. E. 2d at 178. The fact that a defect is obvious should not
vitiate a duty otherwise owing to the plaintiff; the obviousness of the danger
should rather raise the question of plaintiff's contributory fault and such a question
is properly for a jury. Person v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 187 F. 2d 832, 837
(1951). See accord, Restatement, Torts Sec. 398 (1934), comment b.
The fact that onion toppers are commonly manufactured without guards
or accessible stopping devices is not conclusive that the manufacturer has used
reasonable care in construction. Common prudence is not always the measure
of reasonable prudence. T. J. Hooper, 60 F. 2d. 737, 740 (2d. Cir. 1932). If
the cost for such improvement is small compared to the foreseeable risk without
it, then care is required to avoid the risk. See L. Hand, J. in United States v. Car-
roll Towing Co., 159 F. 2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
Why is the manufacturer's duty to use reasonable care obviated when the
danger he creates is patent? The duty should arise by the foreseeability that the
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one injured would fall within the risk created by his conduct. Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928); Mac Pherson v. Buick Mo-
tor Co., supra at 390, 111 N. B. at 1053. Social conditions that once demanded
temporary protective judicial legislation for manufacturers no longer exist. See
Seavey, Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 Harv. L Rev. 372, 379 (1939).
There are no legal or social barriers that now prevent approaching the man-
ufacturer liability cases from the standpoint of the general principles of negligence.
It is submitted that the complaint in Campo v. Scofield stated a cause of action in
negligence; a preclusion of a manufacturer's responsibility should not rest on the
patency or obviousness of the danger he creates.
Sheldon Hurwitz
CIVIL PRACTICE-PREFERENCE IN DOCKETING DENIED THOUGH PARTY
AGED, INFIRM, AND DESTITUTE
Plaintiff, over 72 years of age, received injuries in an accident allegedly due
to the negligence of the Defendant and moves for preference in docketing this
action for trial In support of this contention, the following facts are alleged.
Plaintiff received a fractured femur necessitating a metal pin in the hip, but is
too old for a cast. According to physician's affidavit, Plaintiff is "totally and
completely disabled," and according to physician's testimony under oath, Plain-
tiff's injury is permanent. Further, due to the effects of the injury and Plaintiff's
age, it is extremely likely that he may not survive to trial in the regular order.
The doctor bill is unpaid. Neither Plaintiff nor his wife, who is 70, has a bank
account. There is no insurance except a $500.00 life policy to cover burial
expenses. Plaintiff's income, received as Social Security benefits, is $35.00 a
month; that of his wife, $19.00 a month. They must pay $34.00 a month rent,
exclusive of gas and electricity. Only occasionally do various members of the
family contribute to their aid. Held (3-2): 'Motion for preference properly
denied under Rule 151 of Rules of Civil Practice. Bitterman v. 2007 Davidson
Avenue, Inc., 278 A. D. 759, 104 N. Y. S. 2d 81. (1st Dept. 1951).
Subsection (3) of Rule 151 states that preference may be granted in "an
action or special proceeding in which it is shown to the court or a judge thereof
that the interest of justice will be served by an early trial or hearing thereof."
This section was proposed by the Judicial Council to "simplify and consolidate
for the entire State the procedure to be followed in obtaining a preference." It
was designed to replace certain subdivisions of Section 138 of the Civil Practice
Act which were in a state of cumbersome confusion. Rule 151 was needed to
alleviate the technical procedure by which preference was being granted in nearly
all cases, and to return the exercise of discretion to a consideration of the facts
